Bond Ratings

One of the central claims of public administration is that management matters for the performance of public entities. Quantifying the impact of organizational management is thus central to the empirical evaluation of this claim. Utilizing novel features of the Government Performance Project (GPP), we assess the impact of state‐level management practices on the credit quality of US states. The central challenge—that both the GPP data and bond ratings take the form of ordinal grades—suggests a common solution utilizing multiple indicators of a latent construct (management capacity and credit quality) with appropriate measurement models. After describing the characteristics of the measurement approach, we derive management capacity scores from the GPP data and credit quality scores using bond ratings from the three rating agencies. These derived scores then allow us to test linkages between credit quality of the US states and broad aspects of their relative management capacity. On the whole, we show that financial management capacity influences credit quality, while the evidence is less clear that other forms of management capacity matter.

The battles playing out in local governments across America over development and growth management have important long-term implications that are often difficult to measure because of the long lag between policy decisions and the consequences of those decisions. This study suggests one way of investigating the long-term effects of policy decisions in the area of growth management. The consequences of development and growth management policies should be of great interest to those who invest in the debt issued by a community because it is the value of property that provides the underlying guarantee of that debt. One might assume that aggressive development is good for investors because a larger tax base increases the size of the underlying asset guaranteeing the debt, but borrowing from the dominant model in the investment literature on asset pricing, this article suggests that investors are significantly concerned with the future variability in the value of an investment. Future change, therefore—or at least the possibility of change—represents a risk for investors, a risk that is manifested in lower bond ratings and ultimately in higher interest costs on a jurisdiction’s debt. Support for this notion is illustrated in a test on a sample of cities in Massachusetts.

Bond ratings on state-issued debt provide a signal to credit markets that help them charge an appropriate interest rate, based on the risk of payment default. Though actual default may occur only in extreme circumstances, observed differences in ratings and interest costs across states and time demonstrate that a sound economy, strong financials, and stable policies matter. When data on the factors that presumably affect ratings is public and easily accessible, making sense of differences of opinion between bond rating agencies is difficult. We suggest that such differences—observed as so-called split bond ratings—are often ephemeral. Utilizing a simulation method to uncover the latent credit risk presented by each state, we show that split ratings on state bonds are often due to the fact that presumed category overlap between rating agencies is absent when evaluated on a common latent scale. Most observed state bond rating splits from 1997 through 2006 can be explained by this category mismatch. Our approach has broad implications for pricing state debt, as well as pricing rated debt in other capital market sectors.

Credit markets face an inherent risk that derives from future policy changes when considering the purchase of debt issued by state governments. An enacting government coalition issuing long-term debt cannot make a credible commitment to maintain the existing debt repayment policy into the future. In the face of this commitment problem, investors (and the rating agencies that serve those investors) look to recent political turnover and the existence of divided government to estimate the possibility that some future government coalition will remain substantially similar to the enacting coalition. Political turnover and divided government suggest to the credit markets that future coalitions may act opportunistically regarding debt repayment. This risk of opportunistic behavior, we argue, manifests in lower ratings of state debt. We empirically examine this claim in a model of state bond ratings from 1995 through 2000.